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Property: The Future of Human Tissue?* 
Jonathan Yearworth and Others v. North Bristol NHS Trust 
[2009] EWCA Civ 37 
 
Introduction 
There has been a distinct reluctance on the part of the courts to contend 
with the problem of property in the body and bodily materials. English law 
in general adheres to the ‘no property’ rule, although it does allow that 
human tissues can be property for certain well circumscribed purposes. As 
Mason and Laurie maintain this is often done “as a means to other legal 
ends”.1 The Court of Appeal ruling in the case of Yearworth2 both confirms 
and challenges this position. The case represents a landmark judgement on 
the question of whether individuals can be legally said to have property in 
their bodies. More specifically the case addresses the question of ownership 
in sperm. The significance of the judgement lies not in the decision itself 
but in how it was reached. 
The facts of the case are straightforward enough. Mr Yearworth and 
the five other claimants had all been diagnosed with cancer and had 
undergone chemotherapy treatment at Bristol Southmead Hospital. Since 
the hospital has a fertility unit licensed under the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 19903, the men were offered the option to have samples of 
their semen frozen and stored for use at a later date due to the potential 
damaging effect of the chemotherapy on their fertility. Acting on the advice 
received the six men produced samples for storage. Each of the claimants 
had consented to the storage of their semen for ten years which is the 
maximum allowable time under the 1990 Act. On 28/29 June 2003 the 
storage system at the hospital failed. As a result the men’s semen thawed 
and the sperm contained therein was irreversibly damaged.  
In the County Court the case was pleaded in negligence, and, as such, 
while the North Bristol NHS Trust admitted a duty to take reasonable care 
of the samples and that it was in breach of this duty, it denied liability. The 
Trust claimed that the loss of the sperm did not represent the kind of 
damage required for an action in negligence. Judge Griggs deliberated on 
two key issues: firstly, whether the damage to the sperm in itself constituted 
a personal injury to the claimants; and, secondly, whether the sperm was 
their property. He also considered the issue of damages. In respect of these 
issues the judge held that the damage to the sperm did not constitute a 
personal injury nor was the sperm to be considered to be the claimants’ 
property. For this reason while he commented on the matter of damages his 
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decisions here were of no practical effect given his findings against the 
claimants regarding both personal injury and property.  
While Judge Griggs only heard arguments relating to personal injury 
and property, the Court of Appeal also considered whether there was any 
liability in bailment or contract. The Court upheld the judge’s ruling in 
respect of personal injury but reversed the decision that the claimants did 
not have property in their sperm samples. Notwithstanding the fact that it 
recognised the men’s property in their stored sperm samples the Court 
concluded that for the purpose of assessing damages an action in bailment 
might be more fruitful than one in tort. Consequently, it ruled that there had 
been a bailment of the sperm to the Trust and that the Trust was in fact 
liable here as well.  
The interest for legal scholars in Yearworth stems from two aspects: 
firstly, it represents the first major departure from previous judicial 
reasoning on the issue of property in the body and separated body parts; 
and, secondly, it is unique in its assessment of the facts through the law of 
bailment. As such this note will focus on these aspects of the judgement, 
leaving aside the issue of personal injury. 
 
Body of Law 
Yearworth is not unique in its determination that separated body parts are 
capable of being property at law and thus the ruling of the Court of Appeal 
is, perhaps, not without precedent in this respect. It does, however, part 
ways with previous judicial reasoning in the manner in which their 
Lordships reached their decision. In order to appreciate the significance of 
this departure we must give some texture to it by briefly setting out the 
background from which the Court was working. 
It has long been accepted in English law that there is ‘no property in a 
corpse’. The exact origins of this are unclear. It is often attributed to Coke, 
who in 1644 wrote: 
The burial of the Cadaver (that is, caro data vermibus) is nullis 
in bonis, and belongs to Ecclesiastical cognizance.4 
Indeed in this case this is the authority cited, however, it may be 
attributable to the Haynes’ Case in 1614.5 The meaning in both instances is 
contested6 with Mason and Laurie maintaining that that the ruling in the 
later was not that the corpse was not property, but that it could not own 
property. 7  Regardless of its rather questionable origins the dictum was 
entrenched in English law by the nineteenth century being cited in R v Lynn 
(1788)8, R v Sharpe (1857)9, Foster v Dodd (1866)10, R v Price (1884)11, and 
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Williams v Williams (1881-85)12 during that period. The ‘no property’ rule 
whilst serving religious sentiment and ecclesiastical law13 was problematic 
when the cases appeared before the courts. This was especially so for cases 
that ought to have been prosecuted in theft. This was because, as Mason 
and Laurie point out, “if there is no property, there can be no theft” 14. 
Consequently, cases, such as those cited above, were decided without 
recourse to the sanctions to which property can give rise. Instead the 
judgements were decided on issues of religion, public health and public 
decency. 
 
The application of skill 
In recent times the case of R v Kelly and Lindsay15 challenged the position 
that there were no circumstances under which property could exist in 
human body parts. The case was that of a Royal College of Surgeons 
technician who removed body parts for use by an artist for moulds of a 
sculpture. The accused argued that theft could not have taken place as there 
were no property rights attached to the objects that had been taken. 
Although the courts did not recognise full ownership in this case they did 
identify a sufficient proprietary interest. In Kelly the Court of Appeal held 
that: 
. . . parts of a corpse are capable of being property within s.4 of 
the Theft Act, if they have acquired different attributes by 
virtue of the application of skill, such as dissection or 
preservation techniques, for exhibition or teaching purposes.16  
Here Rose LJ was reliant on the 1908 Australian case of Doodewood v 
Spence17 which held that: 
[W]hen a person has by the lawful exercise of work or skills so 
dealt with a human body or part of a human body that it has 
acquired some attributes differentiating it from a mere corpse 
awaiting burial he acquires a right to retain possession of it, at 
least as against any person not entitled to have delivered to him 
for the purpose of burial.18 
While the Court in Kelly did question the dubious origins of the work and 
skill principle Rose LJ felt it was for Parliament and not the Court to 
change it if required.19  
The ruling in Kelly, however, was out of keeping with that made in 
Dobson v North Tyneside Health Authority20 two years earlier. Here the 
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family of a woman who had died of a brain tumour needed samples of her 
brain tissue in order to establish that the hospital had failed in giving the 
appropriate diagnosis in an acceptable time. The hospital had disposed of 
the brain after a time and the family claimed that this was unlawful. Gibson 
LJ held that the hospital fixation of the brain for use within the coroner’s 
jurisdiction was not equivalent to preserving it with the intention of using it 
as a specimen and, therefore, did not transform it into property. The matter 
was again addressed in 2004 in the case of AB and Others v Leeds Teaching 
Hospital NHS Trust21 where the assumption in Doodewood was upheld22. 
Clarke LCJ, giving the judgement of the Court in Yearworth, does not 
deny that the storage of sperm in liquid nitrogen represented “an application 
to the sperm of work and skill which conferred on it a substantially 
different attribute”. 23  In this respect his analysis is in keeping with the 
decision in Kelly rather than Dobson. Despite this the decision in Yearworth 
parts company with the ‘work and skill’ principle as the proper basis for 
conferring property rights. To this end the Lord Chief Justice says:  
[W]e are not content to see the common law in this area 
founded upon the principle in Doodewood, which was devised 
as an exception to a principle, itself of exceptional character, 
relating to the ownership of a human corpse.24 
The Court followed on from this by explicitly rejecting the application of 
skill as a valid dividing line between those tissues which can be said to be 
owned and those which cannot, with his Lordship saying that such a 
distinction was “not entirely logical.”25 
The judgement here is interesting not only in going against the 
previous common law doctrine regarding the application of skill but also 
because it is could be considered to be out of step with the requirements of 
the Human Tissue Act 2004 on the matter. The 2004 Act is not directly 
relevant to the task at hand in Yearworth because sperm fall outwith its 
remit, 26  instead being subject to the statutory provisions of the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as amended by the Act of 2008). 
Nonetheless the 2004 Act is noteworthy for the fact that it has enshrined the 
application of skill exception into statute.27 It could be argued that, despite 
the flawed origins of the exception, that its presence in recent legislation 
gives an indication of the will of Parliament on the issue of human tissue. 
The Lord Chief Justice, however, notes that its wording does not 
necessarily preclude property being recognised on a different basis, and, as 
a consequence, the judgement here is not precluded by its provisions.28 
It is clear that the ‘application of skill’ is not considered to be an 
adequate basis for property in human tissue. The Court is explicit that there 
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can be property in human tissue quite regardless of whether anything has 
been done to it to alter its attributes. As we will see below the Court is 
concerned with the control that individuals have over their tissues, but 
despite this it is not altogether clear where it sees the claimants’ property 
control as stemming from. In the judgement Clarke LCJ states that the men 
“[b]y their bodies, they alone generated and ejaculated the sperm.”29 Since 
he does not elaborate on this it is difficult to interpret but appears to be 
somewhat neo-Lockean in tone, perhaps alluding to a natural rights view of 
property. Whether this is correct or not it seems, at least, that the same 
reasoning could apply to other bodily tissues. It would not be prudent, 
however, to extend the implications of the words of the Court too far 
beyond their scope. For example, there is no evidence that it sees its 
judgement as applying to the whole body. Indeed there is something to be 
said to the contrary. Firstly, while the Court adopts a classical bundle of 
rights view of ownership30, it sees this as “different collections of rights 
held by persons over physical and other things.”31 This wording, perhaps, 
suggests a view of property which draws a bright line between owner and 
what is owned.32 It is not altogether apparent that this is the opinion in this 
case. A perfunctory acceptance is given to the ruling in R v Bentham,33 
which gives legal support for the notion of separation as pivotal in deciding 
whether something could be deemed to be the appropriate subject of 
property rights, yet great emphasis is placed on the legal rules that protect 
the “body and bodily autonomy”.34 It might be that their Lordships see the 
control rights entailed in these protections as amounting to property, but 
this might be to infer too much.  
 
Control and property 
Counsel for the Trust argued that the provisions of the HFE Act 1990 
effectively obviated any claim that the men might have based in property.35 
It was counsel’s contention that “the men could not have directed the unit 
to use their sperm in any particular way . . . [they] could only have 
requested the unit to use their sperm in a particular way”.36 This argument 
was rejected by the Court of Appeal which, while accepting that the 
claimants could not have directed the use of their sperm, denied that the 
presence of limitations on usage amounted to a negation of their ownership 
in their sperm.37 Those units holding a licence pursuant of the 1990 Act are 
required to use stored gametes and embryos only for those purposes set out 
                                                 
29
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in Schedule 3 of that Act and for which consent has been obtained. As 
affirmed in the recent case of Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd38 individuals 
may withdraw their consent at any time.39 Rather than seeing the Act as 
reducing the proprietary control of the claimants over their sperm, the Court 
in this case have taken the stringent consent provisions of the Act as a 
powerful confirmation of their ownership. The fact that the control granted 
under the Act is a negative rather than positive control does not dissuade 
their Lordships in this matter.40 In addition the Lord Chief Justice pointed to 
examples of so-called ‘real’ property where ownership is not denied in 
virtue of the limitations that are placed on the use of the object.41  
In addition to domestic law considerations regarding recognition of 
ownership in body parts the Court also considered two Californian cases: 
Moore v Regents of the University of California42 and Hecht v Superior 
Court of Los Angeles County43. Of the two it seems to be the second of 
these cases which is of interest for the judgement in Yearworth. This was 
the case of a woman whose deceased partner had deposited sperm for use at 
a later date. The Court in this case ruled that the sperm was capable of 
being property and thus capable of being subject to the provisions of the 
deceased’s Will. In the case under consideration here it was the opinion of 
the Court that: 
[I]t is hard to regard ownership of stored sperm for the 
purposes of directing its use following death as other than a 
step further than that which the men invite us to take in the 
present case.44 
As alluded to by the Lord Chief Justice it is logically difficult to see how 
the self-same sample of sperm (or indeed any tissue sample) could be 
considered to be property once the source of that sample has died if it was 
not already capable of being property before their death. Furthermore the 
ruling in Hecht cannot simply be taken to be the recognition of a 
proprietary interest that begins after death. This is because the judgement 
was concerned with the disposition of the sperm at Will and as such it is 
concerned with the legitimacy of a decision which took place pre-mortem. 
Effectively the sperm must have been capable of being property at the time 
the Will was drawn up. 
 
Gratuitous bailment 
It is clear that the Court in Yearworth considers the rights of control that the 
claimants had over their samples to be key. As such once their Lordships 
were satisfied that since the sperm was to be regarded as the men’s property 
for the purpose of an action in tort that this necessarily implied that the 
claimants were capable of holding “such lesser rights in relation to it as 
                                                 
38
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would render them capable of having been bailors of it.”45 The interest of 
the Court in assessing the matter through the law of bailment rests on the 
supposition that the facts of the case more closely resemble contract than 
tort. 46  Bailment is notable in its distinction from contract since only 
possession rather than ownership is transferred between the bailor and the 
bailee. Given the earlier finding in favour of ownership there could have 
been no disputing, in this case, the fact that the Trust had taken possession 
rather than ownership of the sperm samples. It was, however, to be 
determined what duties and responsibilities this entailed and the scope of 
these. The Court, in its assessment, relied on the judgements in Coggs v. 
Bernard 47 , Wilson v. Brett 48 , Midland Silicones Ltd v. Scruttons Ltd 49 , 
Gilchrist Watt and Sanderson Pty. Ltd v. York Products Pty. Ltd50, and Port 
Swettenham Authority v. T.W.Wu and Co. (M) Sdn. Bhd.51. Utilising the 
principles in these cases the conclusion reached by their Lordships was that 
a gratuitous bailment existed and that by taking exclusive possession of the 
sperm samples the fertility unit at the hospital “held itself out to the men as 
able to deploy special skill in preserving the sperm.” 52  In accepting 
possession of the sample the unit took on a duty to take reasonable care of 
the sperm and the subsequent events constituted a breach of that duty.53 In 
addition, given its resemblance on the facts to contract, the Court denied 
that liability in this case lay in tort.54  
The judgement here is particularly noteworthy because it is the first 
time that a case involving human tissue has been considered under the law 
of bailment. The Court in this case was satisfied that any assessment for 
damages could include damages for psychiatric injury and/or mental 
distress. This is to the advantage of any claimants bringing an action since 
these are notoriously difficult to recover in tort. Thus the ruling creates 
another option for those seeking remedial action. While it seems likely that 
similar reasoning would obtain in other cases involving gametes (and 
probably embryos), it is not clear that it would hold in cases involving other 
tissues. This is because great emphasis was placed on the mental 
distress/psychiatric injury suffered by the men due to the implication of the 
loss of the sperm for their future chances of fatherhood. 55  While cases 
involving other tissues may well be actionable in bailment they are unlikely 
to attract the same level of damages as those involving gametes or embryos. 
Also of significance amongst their Lordships comments on bailment 
is their discussion of Washington University v. Catalona56 which they used 
to reinforce their position regarding property. Primarily this case was about 
                                                 
45
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whether individuals who had donated tissue to the University had any 
“continuing rights in relation to it as bailors”.57 The Court held that they did 
not because they had donated the tissue.58 For Clarke LCJ the fact that that 
the tissue had been donated implies that it “was property capable of passing 
from the donors to the donee.”59 This seems to be a direct challenge to those 
who would deny property in body parts but yet want to allow for 
individuals to control the fate of their organs and tissues. This is a 
significant indication that the Court does not consider proprietary 
considerations to be fundamentally linked to commercial ones and that in 
cases of gift or donation the reason that individuals can legitimately donate 




This case is not the first time where it has been held that there is property in 
human tissue, but hitherto the approach of the law to this has been 
somewhat muddled. Mason and Laurie commenting on the approach of the 
law to the issue of to the governance of human tissue have previously said 
that: 
[T]he law tempers the consequent confusion in delivering one 
clear message: the one person who is least likely to have 
property rights in body parts is the person from whom these 
parts were taken.60 
The judgement in Yearworth is striking and represents a step away from 
both confusion and injustice. The Court’s rejection of the work or skill 
principle will most likely be welcomed by those who have for a long time 
pointed to its dubious origins and questioned its application in governing 
human tissue. The effect of this move away from this principle as the sole 
basis of property in human tissue is to shift the property focus, and the 
consequent protections of this towards the individuals who are the sources 
of body parts and tissue samples. The application of skill does give a way to 
recognise property in human tissue. However, without additional bases for 
recognising property, its effect is to exclude the very source of these tissues 
from legal ownership. The ruling in Yearworth tries to redress the balance 
and explicitly vests individuals with property rights in their own body parts 
and tissues (or at least in their gametes). In addition, it sets a precedent for 
individuals to seek a remedy in bailment. This gives claimants more scope 
to recover damages than a similar claim in tort. 
The good of this development notwithstanding it is not altogether 
clear what the implications of the judgement are for wider considerations 
involving the use of human tissue. The reasoning employed by the Court 
could logically be extended to apply to bodily tissues other than gametes 
and indeed whole organs and body parts, but it remains to be seen whether 
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members of the judiciary will follow suit if relevant cases come before 
them. It could be that gametes are seen as a special type of tissue which 
compelled their Lordships to try and seek adequate remedy for the men. 
Those who oppose the notion of property in the body might argue that 
consent does the work needed in offering protections over the body and its 
parts and products. Yet this case demonstrates that there are situations in 
which it is necessary to appeal to proprietary notions in order to offer 
remedies for wrongs committed. While the scope of the argument put 
forward in this judgement remains to be tested, the one thing that is surely 
certain is that it will be tested. Now that the door has been opened we are 
likely to see the issue of property in the body and its parts being argued 
before the Courts again in the future. 
 
 
 
